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chapter 1 3
Virtue, self-mastery, and the autocracy
of practical reason
Anne Margaret Baxley
Kant’s theory of virtue has received considerably less attention than the
moral theory set out in his most widely read ethical texts, theGroundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals and theCritique of Practical Reason. Moreover, this
account of virtue has not always been well understood. In light of the fact
that Kant characterizes virtue in terms of strength of will over feelings and
inclinations that conflict with duty, commentators have suggested that
Kant’s account of virtue is impoverished, insofar as it appears to be a recipe
for nothing more than continence.1 Part of the problem in uncovering a
comprehensive picture of Kant’s full account of moral character lies with
Kant, for his remarks about virtue in his later and less well-known writings
are scattered and not always systematically presented. Although theDoctrine
of Virtue contains a sustained treatment of virtue and our various ethical
obligations (duties of virtue), that work requires careful interpretation and
reconstruction. Fortunately, Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, now easily accessible
in English translation, provide an additional valuable resource for readers
interested in understanding a more complete picture of Kant’s conception
of virtue, its importance in his overall ethics, and its relation to other
foundational concepts in his moral theory.
This essay analyzes four central theses concerning the nature of virtue
that Kant himself emphasizes in the Lectures on Ethics. Although these four
themes do not provide an exhaustive account of Kant’s theory of virtue,
together they lay a solid foundation for any systematic interpretation of
Kant’s considered views on moral character.
1 This distinction between full virtue and mere continence, which is crucial for Aristotle’s moral
psychology, is understood to be a distinguishing feature of classical virtue ethics more generally.
Contemporary theorists who have questioned whether Kant has the resources to distinguish between
the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does include Julia
Annas, Talbot Brewer, David Brink, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Martha Nussbaum. See Annas 1993,
53 and 2006, 517; Brewer 2002; Brink 1999, 580 and 2000, 431; Hursthouse 1999, 104; and Nussbaum
2001, 172. I explore this theme at length in Baxley 2010.
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1 Virtue involves moral self-mastery and moral strength of will
In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant appeals to the key notion of self-command or
self-mastery (Selbstbeherrschung) to characterize virtue. Self-control in the
service of prudence, which ultimately aims at the satisfaction of inclination,
is not sufficient for virtue, for, as Kant puts it, “true self-control is moral in
character” (C 27:361). The self-control crucial for moral agency is distin-
guished from mere prudential self-control in that it involves mastering and
ruling the rabble of sensibility so that one possesses the fortitude to do one’s
duty from duty in spite of any obstacles that might stand in the way
(C 27:360–362). Virtue, as Kant thus conceives of it, primarily involves
power, strength and authority (C 27:465; V 27:492). More specifically, it is a
distinctlymoral strength of will or soul, where strength connotes the force to
withstand all temptations to transgress the moral law and is manifest in a
victory over inclination (C 27: 465; M II 29:603–606; V 27:491f ).2
In his discussions of virtue, Kant draws a distinction between an
executive and a directing power of the will, indicating that self-mastery
is distinguished not only from mere prudential self-regulation, but also
from the more familiar Kantian conception of self-legislation. In his
words: “We have a double authority over ourselves, the disciplinary and
the productive. The executive authority can compel us, in spite of all
impediments, to produce certain effects, and in that case it has might. But
the directing authority exists merely to guide the forces of the mind”
(C 27:363). The notion of a disciplinary or executive authority that Kant
invokes here in an effort to highlight what is characteristic of self-mastery
is described as an acquired strength of will to compel ourselves to act in
accordance with norms of pure practical reason (norms that we give
ourselves in virtue of our directing authority). The thought behind this
distinction is that, as self-legislating beings with autonomous wills, we are
capable of directing ourselves to comply with moral laws grounded in pure
practical reason alone. More than this legislative authority is required of
us, however, if we are to live fully in accord with the demands of pure
practical reason, executing the moral law. For this task, we need self-
mastery, the actual moral strength of will to weaken a strong (internal)
opponent to duty and to put the law into practice. In underscoring the
idea that such rational self-command is the very condition under which we
finite rational beings have the power to resist being determined to act by
2 For Kant’s account of virtue as moral strength of will in theMetaphysics of Morals, see MS 6:389, 393,
397, 405, and 408f.
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strong natural inclinations and to conform our wills to self-legislated
moral commands, Kant explains:
That man, moreover, should act in accordance or adequacy with the moral
laws, can occur insofar as he has repressed and conquered, through the
moral law, the inclination he harbors to deviate or do the opposite. The
struggle of inclination with the moral law, and the constant disposition
(intentio constans) to carry out his duties, therefore constitutes what we call
virtue. (V 27:492)
It should come as no surprise that being one’s own master in this
Kantian sense requires self-discipline and self-compulsion (Selbstzwang)
(M II 29:616–618; V 27:520f ). In disciplining herself, the virtuous agent
plays the role of sovereign over herself, or, better, is one in whom morality
itself has sovereign authority (C 27:361). In light of the fact that passions,
as Kant conceives of them, are pernicious forms of inclination that conflict
with moral concerns and lead readily to vice, moral self-discipline involves
ruling oneself so that one has no passions.3 In short, morality commands
us to yield nothing to passion, a point that leads Kant to praise the Stoics
for recommending the extirpation of passions as the proper path to virtue
(C 27:368).4
Of course, the notion of self-compulsion might sound like a harsh or
repressive recommendation for acquiring moral character. Kant, however,
believes that self-discipline carries with it its own rewards. As a form of
strength, virtue comes in degrees, and the more disciplined and hence
virtuous a person is, the more he is free (V 27:520).5 In emphasizing this
close connection between virtue, self-compulsion, and freedom, Kant insists:
The more a man considers a moral act to be irresistible, and the more he is
compelled to do it by duty, the freer he is. For in that case he is employing the
power he has, to rule over his strong inclinations. So freedom is all the more
displayed, the greater the moral compulsion. (M II 29:617)
3 Kant holds that affects (Affekte) and passions (Leidenshaften) are particular forms of feelings and
inclinations that are inherently problematic from the standpoint of both morality and prudence,
because they are directly contrary to reason. For Kant’s remarks about affects and passions in relation
to virtue and self-mastery in the Lectures on Ethics, see C 27:368 and V 27:612. Kant’s official account of
affects and passions in his published writings can be found in MS 6:407–409; ApH 7:251–282;
KU 5:272n.; and RGV 6:29n. For a helpful discussion of the connection between Kant’s views
regarding affects and passions and the Stoics, see Sherman 1997, 121–186. Julia Annas’ analysis of the
Stoics’ account of emotions also includes a useful comparison of the Stoics and Kant. See Annas 1993,
53–66.
4 Although Kant shares the Stoic view that passions are wholly at odds with reason andmust be avoided,
he expresses doubts about how far we can progress in getting rid of them (C 27: 368).
5 For an excellent discussion of Kant’s conception of virtue as a source of inner freedom, see Engstrom
2002.
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Moreover, the self-commanding agent enjoys a sense of equanimity that
stems from the fact that he does not experience strong inner turmoil
between duty and contrary inclinations.6 The state of the soul of the
agent lacking in virtue, by comparison, is characterized in terms of ongoing
conflict and strife. As Kant characterizes the difference: “Without disciplin-
ing his inclinations, man can attain to nothing, and hence in self-mastery
there lies an immediate worth, for to be master over oneself demonstrates an
independence of all things. Where there is no such self-mastery there is
anarchy” (C 27:361f ). Still worse, the vicious person is portrayed as being
enslaved by the power of natural inclinations (C 27:464). In light of the fact
that moral self-discipline and self-mastery promotes freedom from deter-
mination by strong inclinations and signifies a condition of the soul akin to
psychic harmony (a sense of inner freedom), it is easy to see why Kant holds
that virtue is its own reward.7
2 Autocracy is the ideal form of moral self-governance
required for virtue
Kant’s various comments concerning the nature of virtue and self-
command in the Lectures on Ethics indicate that he belongs to a rich
philosophical tradition of theorizing about virtue that relies heavily on
political metaphors about governance to illuminate moral ideals about
self-governance. We are told that the self-mastery required for virtue
provides a model for a “vigilant government,” one in which reason must
exercise force in relation to sensibility in order to “compel this rabble under
the rule in accordance with ordinance and regulation” (C 27:360). The
specific term Kant uses to characterize his favored ideal form of moral self-
governance is autocracy. Although he explicitly appeals to the term only
once in his most extended published treatment of virtue, the Doctrine of
Virtue, it appears or is suggested more frequently in his remarks about virtue
and self-mastery in the Lectures on Ethics. This notion of autocracy underlies
6 In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that virtues involves consciousness of mastery over
inclinations and produces a sense of independence from inclinations, thereby affecting a feeling of
moral contentment that Kant describes as a negative form of happiness (KpV 5:118f ). For other
passages in which he elaborates on the relation between virtue, self-compulsion, freedom, and moral
contentment, see M II 29:617; V 27:520, 643, 647f; KpV 5:38, 111–119, 155f, 161; and MS 6:380, 406f.
7 Kant repeatedly warns against recommending virtue for its beneficial consequences, insisting that
virtue should be praised because it possesses its own inner worth and is its own reward. For Kant’s
account of virtue as its own reward, see G 4:426n., 442f, 450; and MS 6:391, 396, 406.
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Kant’s considered account of moral character, providing the key to under-
standing his distinctive concept of virtue.8
Kant introduces the notion of autocracy by insisting that true moral
strength of will involves autocracy in addition to autonomy, noting that,
“[i]f reason determines the will through the moral law, it has the force of an
incentive, and in that case has, not autonomy merely, but also autocracy. It
then has both legislative and executive power” (M II 29:626). Autocracy
signifies the self-command at the heart of virtue, for it represents “the
authority to compel the mind, despite all the impediments to doing so. It
involves mastery over oneself, and not merely the power to direct”
(C 27:362). As actual strength of will to resist forces in conflict with duty,
autocracy is consistently portrayed as an executive authority or power of the
will, which Kant contrasts with a separate legislative authority or power to
guide the will in accordance with norms of pure practical reason (C 27:362;
M II 29:626). Kant speaks of an autocracy of “the moral law” (or “laws”),
“reason,” or “freedom,” but also refers to an autocracy of the “soul,” “heart”
or “mind” over inclinations.9 When he appeals to the concept of autocracy
in the Doctrine of Virtue, he uses it in precisely the same way as in the
Lectures on Ethics, namely, to underscore its importance for his overall
picture of virtue as acquired moral strength of will and to distinguish it
from autonomy. Having differentiated between a doctrine of morals, which
he explicitly connects with autonomy, and a doctrine of virtue, which he
says “also” involves autocracy, Kant explains that autocracy is distinct from
autonomy insofar as it involves “consciousness of the capacity to master
one’s inclinations when they rebel against the law, a capacity which, though
not directly perceived, is yet rightly inferred from the moral categorical
imperative” (MS 6:383, 515).10
Kant understands autocracy foremost as a form of self-rule in accordance
with the commands of practical reason over sensibility, a model of self-
governance presupposing the power to control and limit the influence on
the will of feelings and inclinations at odds with moral demands. It stands
8 For my extended treatment of Kant’s account of autocracy, see Baxley 2010. In addition, see König
1994. For a nice discussion of the intrinsic value of autocracy in Kant’s ethics, see Guyer 1993, 346–350
as well as Guyer’s later discussion in Guyer 2005, 136–141. Other brief accounts of autocracy can be
found in Allison 1990, 164 and Carnois 1987, 120.
9 Kant refers to an autocracy of practical reason (MS 6:383) or reason (M II 29:626), an autocracy of
moral laws (VMS 23: 396), and an autocracy of freedom in relation to happiness (R #6867, 19:186).
For passages focusing on autocracy as a power of the heart, soul, or mind, see C 27:362, 364, 368, 378.
10 Similarly, in his notes to the Doctrine of Virtue, he writes that the virtuous person is conscious of “an
autocracy (not merely autonomy) of moral laws against all conflicting impulses of sensibility
(inclinations)” (VMS 23:396).
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for the executive power of the soul to enforce the morally good choices
legislated by the directing or guiding power of the will (a power belonging to
the rational will in virtue of the property of autonomy) (M II 29:626). The
fact that autocracy represents the executive authority of reason’s prescrip-
tions in accordance with moral laws underlies Kant’s repeated remark that
autocracy is the subjective condition of the performance of duty, for, as he
puts it, maintaining command over oneself is the condition under which
one is able to perform the self-regarding duties and thereby all other duties
(C 27:360, 364, 368).
Although Kant tends to identify autocracy with rational rule over sensi-
bility, it is important to note that he conceives of autocracy as a broad and
encompassing form of moral self-governance, one that is not exhausted by
the simple notion of strength in opposition to sensible feelings and incli-
nations. Kant holds that human beings possess various mental powers that
bear on morality, and he explicitly discusses the ways in which autocracy
shapes and transforms these morally relevant powers in the virtuous agent
(C 27:364–368). For instance, the autocratic agent is skilled in controlling
her imagination, so that her imagination does not tempt her to pursue
objects that are beyond her reach or especially hard to attain. She is able to
suspend judgment on important matters and is thereby able to refrain from
making rash decisions or acting prior to rational reflection. She possesses
what Kant calls the “power of presence of mind,” characterized as a
harmony of one’s mental powers, where such harmony eases the burden
of carrying out one’s work (C 27:366). In addition, the autocratic agent
demonstrates a degree of self-knowledge and capacity for self-examination
that the weak-willed agent and the vicious agent lack. By disciplining
herself, instead of yielding to emotions and inclinations, the autocratic
agent has the fortitude to resist feelings and inclinations that can pose
temptations to duty; she displays constancy of mind and the cheerful
heart of virtue; and she enjoys a feeling of inner worth that is consequential
upon having a firm disposition to do one’s duty from duty (C 27:361f;
M II 29:617, 623; V 27:520, 643, 648f ).
Given Kant’s more familiar concept of autonomy, the question naturally
arises: What is the precise relation between autonomy and autocracy? This
interpretive puzzle is best addressed by recalling the main features of Kant’s
critical view (first laid out in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals)
that autonomy is a property of the rational will and the foundational
principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant defines autonomy as “the
property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any
property of the objects of volition)” (G 4:440). Autonomy, so conceived,
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is essentially a capacity for self-legislation, a capacity implying the freedom
to make universal law through one’s own will, or freedom to adopt maxims
of action that are valid for oneself only insofar they are valid for all other
rational agents. According to Kant’s particular conception of autonomy, the
laws that we give ourselves are prescriptions of our own reason, through
which we freely constrain ourselves in light of our recognition of their
validity for all rational agents.
On the regressive, analytic method of argument he employs in the
Groundwork, Kant assumes that morality requires acting on the basis of
the categorical imperative. He then introduces autonomy as the supreme
principle of morality in the sense of being the necessary condition of the
very possibility of morality. The key point to Kant’s argument in the
Groundwork is that acting on the basis of the categorical imperative
presupposes a capacity to determine oneself to act independently of,
and even contrary to, one’s particular interests as a sensuous being with
needs, namely, one’s empirical interests. Kant treats this notion of self-
determination as one that is built into the characterization of autonomy as
a property of the will. That is, a will and only a will with the property of
autonomy is capable of acting on the categorical imperative, because
only a will capable of determining itself independently of its needs as a
sensuous being can act in accordance with a practical principle that
commands unconditionally because of its mere form.11
This reminder of how Kant conceives of autonomy indicates that the
relation between autonomy and autocracy can be captured by distinguish-
ing between a legislative authority or power of the will for creating and giving
to oneself laws that are universally valid and an executive authority or power of
the will for enforcing and enacting these laws. The former capacity for self-
determination by pure practical reason is one that we all possess in virtue of
our autonomy, and it defines our moral personality. The latter power of self-
rule by pure practical reason is one that we can acquire through a process
of moral self-discipline and self-mastery, and it describes our empirically
acquired moral character.
One final point regarding the nature of autocracy is worth mentioning.
In spite of the unfortunate political connotations associated with the term,
in the Lectures on Ethics, Kant denies that autocracy amounts to wholesale
self-repression. Whereas Baumgarten endorses the idea that virtue entails
self-overcoming or self-conquest (Selbstu¨berwindung) in Philosophical Ethics
(one of the two texts Kant regularly included for discussion in his course on
11 My understanding of Kant’s conception of autonomy is indebted to Allison 1990, 85–106.
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ethics), Kant rejects the idea that proper self-governance by reason involves
waging a war against oneself. As he explains:
Our author goes on to speak of self-conquest. But if a man rules himself so
well that he prevents any rebellion of the rabble in his soul and keeps peace
within it (which here, however, is not contentment with everything, but
good command and unity within the soul), and if he now conducts so good a
government within himself, then no war will arise in him, and where there is
no war, no conquest is necessary either. It is therefore far better if a man is so
governed that he need gain no victory over himself. (C 27:368f )
In short, although autocracy represents a form of self-governance in which
practical reason is sovereign, Kant imagines autocracy to be distinct from
both anarchy (where the mob of sensibility rules over reason) as well as
tyranny (where reason exercises excessive force over sensibility). Kant
explicitly cautions us not to go too far in disciplining our natural inclina-
tions. He thinks excessive self-discipline is actually opposed to our duties
to self, for we have an obligation to provide for ourselves so that we find
satisfaction in life (MS 6:452). It is this very thought – that morality does
not require self-denial – that leads Kant to criticize Diogenes for taking
things too far and overdoing the duty to do without (V 27:650).12
Accordingly, Kant rejects the view he labels ethica morosa (killjoy ethic)
on the grounds that is involves the sacrifice of “all wished-for enjoyment
of happiness” (V 27:663). The Kantian autocratic agent, in whom reason
reigns supreme, need not conquer herself, but must merely work to
maintain constant vigilance over her inclinations so that she knows how
to determine herself to act on moral principles in good or ill fortune
(V 27:663).
3 Virtue presupposes conflict and struggle and is thereby
distinct from holiness
In analyzing the strength required for moral character, Kant regularly
contrasts virtue and holiness, largely to underscore the fact that virtue
presupposes some element of conflict and struggle. Holiness signifies com-
plete purity of will, even of thought. It represents a state of mind from
which an evil desire never arises (M II 29:604). In light of the fact that a holy
12 Diogenes allegedly lived in a wine jar, possessed only one cloak, and discarded his cup so that he could
drink out of his hands, all in the name of simplicity. From Kant’s perspective, however, Diogenes’ life
exemplifies the kind of “morose” or “monkish” virtue we should reject, for there is no purpose in
punishing ourselves by denying ourselves what we can easily acquire (C 27:393f ).
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will possesses a pure moral disposition innately and consequently wills only
what the moral law prescribes, a holy will has no need for virtue, as “the
strength of the resolve to perform our duties, and to strive against the
constant enticements to do otherwise which sensory feelings inspire”
(V 27:570).13 Virtue is thus relevant only for finite (sensuous) rational
beings, imperfect beings who have needs and inclinations that can conflict
with duty and who must exercise self-constraint in order to do what the law
commands (M II 29: 605f ). In emphasizing the notion that virtue entails the
real possibility of acting contrary to the moral law and is thus limited in
scope to finite creatures in whom there are genuine obstacles to morally
good conduct, Kant explains:
Ethics explained by a doctrine of virtue is good inasmuch as virtue belongs
solely before the inner tribunal; but since virtue entails, not just morally good
actions, but at the same time a great possibility of the opposite, and thus
incorporates an inner struggle, this is therefore too narrow a concept, since
we can also ascribe ethics, but not virtue (properly speaking) to the angels and
to God; for in them there is assuredly holiness but not virtue. (H 27:13)
Readers of Kant’s ethics will recall that at times Kant portrays inclinations
themselves as the fundamental problem with which we must contend in our
efforts to fulfill our moral obligations and live in conformity with the moral
law. Inclinations are alleged to be blind and servile and always burdensome
to a rational being (KpV 5:118). In both the second Critique and the
Groundwork, Kant insists that inclinations are so problematic that it must
be the universal wish of all rational beings to be completely free of them
(KpV 5:118; G 4:428). The thought that inclinations are the main impedi-
ment to the conformity of the finite rational will moral laws is likewise
implied in passages from the Lectures on Ethics in which Kant warns that
virtue requires constant vigilance over inclinations and is manifest in a
victory over them (V 27:663; C 27:465).14 Yet, the true opponent of virtue,
as Kant sees it, lies much deeper than our inclinations, namely, in an actual
tendency to evil on our part, which Kant understands as a tendency we
have to subordinate duty to inclination, thereby granting priority to
13 For passages in the Lectures on Ethics in which Kant contrasts virtue and holiness, see H 27:13;
C 27:463f; M II 29:604–606, 611; and V 27:486–492, 518–520. In theCritique of Practical Reason, Kant
defines virtue as a “moral disposition in conflict (im Kampfe), and not holiness in the supposed possession
of a complete purity of dispositions of the will” (KpV 5:84). For additional passages in his published
writings in which he distinguishes virtue from holiness, see G 4:439; KpV 5:32f, 122, 128; and
MS 6:383, 396f, 405.
14 Similarly, in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant characterizes virtue as an acquired capacity “to overcome all
opposing sensible impulses” (MS 6:397).
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considerations based on our happiness over moral concerns. Virtue is “the
strength of soul to withstand, out of duty, the onset of evil,” or “an aptitude,
on moral principles, for overcoming the inclination to evil” (M II 29:603;
C 27:463). In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant characterizes this inclination to
evil as an inclination to deviate from the moral law and act in opposition to
it (V 27:492). In a notable passage in which he makes explicit the idea that
the internal struggle we face in our efforts to conform our actions to the law
is not one of merely controlling our inclinations, but overcoming a deep-
seated tendency to transgress the moral law, Kant claims:
It is just because he possesses by nature a nevertheless conquerable tendency
and propensity to evil, so that he harbors the possibility of being easily drawn
away from good intro transgression, that duty is coupled, in his case, with
moral necessitation, and the latter needed for virtue. (V 27:571)
In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant labels this tendency
to evil “radical evil” in the context of arguing for his official doctrine that
there is a universal, freely chosen propensity (Hang) to evil in human
nature.15 In calling evil “radical,” Kant does not mean to imply that human-
ity is diabolically evil. Instead, he explicitly states that the term “radical”
should be understood in its etymological sense of “roots.”16 Radical evil for
Kant thus signifies the very ground (or root) of the possibility of moral evil
in general and of all actions that are contrary to duty (RGV 6:32).
In Religion, Kant expounds on this doctrine of radical evil by noting, “the
statement, ‘The human being is evil,’ cannot mean anything else than that
he is conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the
(occasional) deviation from it” (RGV 6:32). In other words, the claim that
there is universal propensity to evil in human nature amounts to the claim
that we have a tendency to exercise our free choice (Willku¨r) by adopting a
fundamental maxim to subordinate the moral law to non-moral consider-
ations based on happiness and its principle of self-love (RGV 6:36). Simply
put, Kant holds that we human beings have a propensity to treat happiness
as our supreme or unconditioned good, or a tendency to act in accordance
with the dictates of morality only on the condition that what morality
15 Kant explicitly introduces the doctrine of radical evil in Religion (1793), but the outlines of this
doctrine can be found earlier, in the Groundwork (1785), where Kant writes of “a natural dialectic” of
practical reason, understood as a “propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty and to cast
doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to make
them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy
all their dignity” (G 4:405; cf. G 4:424).
16 The Latin radic- means “roots.” Kant explains that the kind of evil he has in mind is one that is
“entertwined [verwebt] with humanity itself and, as it were, rooted [gewurzelt] in it” (RGV 6:32).
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requires of us does not conflict with the satisfaction of our inclinations (the
sum total of which is happiness).
Of course, the thesis humanity is evil in this sense is a substantive thesis
about human nature, one that sharply separates Kant from classical virtue
theorists. In a discussion in the Lectures on Ethics in which he raises this very
point, Kant indicates that the various ideals of human excellence found in
antiquity fail to provide an appropriate measure of human virtue, precisely
for the reason that the ancients did not see that finite imperfect beings
always require moral strength of will in the face of a powerful (internal)
opponent to duty in the struggle to lead morally good lives. From this
Kantian perspective, then, Diogenes’ perfect man of nature, who lives fully
in accordance with reason without struggle, “has no need of virtue, for he
has no concept of evil” (M II 29:603). In short, as Kant sees it, a concept of
virtue fitting for us mere human beings must retain some element of what
the ancients would view as continence – strength of will in the face of
opposition to duty – because virtue itself is a corrective (more specifically, a
corrective to a strong tendency we have to grant priority to inclinations over
the moral law).17 As Kant thus warns us in the context of reacting
to these ancient models of human excellence: “We can attain to virtue,
i. e. a moral preparedness to withstand all temptations to evil, so far as they
arise from inclinations. The ancient philosophers never got to that point”
(M II 29:604).
The key idea that the very concept of virtue presupposes a notion of inner
conflict does not imply that the Kantian virtuous agent constantly struggles
with actual contrary-to-duty inclinations, always doing her duty from duty
in the face of temptation, or that Kant simply indentifies virtue with mere
continence. On the contrary, the self-commanding agent who has acquired
the moral strength of will to govern her sensible nature and successfully hold
in check her tendency to evil does not experience the internal turmoil that
the continent person and the weak-willed person feel. The Kantian auto-
cratic rules herself in accordance with practical reason and plays the master
over herself; as a result, she possesses a form of independence from inclina-
tions and the temptations associated with them. If we recall, the reason Kant
rejects the idea that virtue involves winning a battle over oneself (self-
conquest) is that autocracy signifies a soul that is unified and at peace,
17 In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant focuses primarily on four particular classical ideals of human excellence:
the Cynic ideal of Diogenes and Antisthenes (natural simplicity), the Epicurean ideal (the man of the
world), the Stoic ideal of Zeno (the sage), and the Christian ideal of holiness (M II 29:603–605;
V 27:647–650). In each case, Kant thinks these ideals miss something at the very heart of virtue,
insofar as virtue involves strength in overcoming a serious “hindrance in the will” (a tendency to evil).
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and not in a perpetual state of discord (C 27:368f). Still, the point remains
that, for Kant, acquiring a virtuous disposition always takes place in a
particular context, namely, one in which we must first break with or over-
come a deep-seated tendency to give priority to inclination over duty, a
tendency we must subsequently remain on guard against, since it can be
overcome and repressed and hence not acted on, but never entirely elimi-
nated (C 27:463f ).18
4 Virtue amounts to a disposition to do one’s duty
from duty and therefore entails constraint
and necessitation by practical reason
Should there be any doubt as to whether Kant treats the concept of duty as
central in his theory of virtue, it is important to see that Kant conceives of
virtue as a settled disposition to do one’s duty from duty, or out of respect
for the law (C 27:308; M II 29:611, 624; V 27:623f, 715). Virtue has its own
motive, which springs from the inner goodness of actions (C 27:308).19 For
one’s action to have moral merit, it is required is that “the action should
have arisen from a purely moral intent, or that only the moral law, and not
inclination of any kind, should have been the motive for it” (V 27:611). The
thought that a morally good disposition involves strength of resolve to fulfill
one’s duties from the motive of duty, not inclination, helps explain why
virtue does not make us happy. In Kant’s words:
Virtue does not flit or curry favor, but is honorable. Duty is not what I do for
my advantage, but what I do for the sake of the law. The cast of mind which
is won over only by reward, is called indoles servilis; that which acts only for
18 The fact that virtue presupposes conflict and struggle with a formidable (internal) opponent explains
why Kant describes the process of acquiring a virtuous disposition in terms of a radical “change of
heart” or “conversion” (RGV 6:47f; C 27:464). Becoming morally good involves reorienting one’s
way of thinking or cast of mind (Denkungsart), by conquering a tendency to evil and adopting an
entirely different fundamental maxim always to subordinate inclination to duty.Moreover, sustaining
one’s virtuous disposition requires continual effort, for the propensity to evil is a powerful foe that can
be overcome but never entirely vanquished. As Kant describes this ongoing ethical task: “However
virtuous a man may be, there are tendencies to evil in him, and he must constantly contend against
them. He must guard against the moral self-conceit of thinking himself morally good, and having a
favorable opinion of himself; that is a dream-like condition, very hard to cure” (C 27:264).
19 In Collins (reflecting notes originally from 1774–1777), where Kant never explicitly formulates the
categorical imperative, he stresses the importance of believing that the rational awareness of what is
intrinsically right and dutiful can move us to act. At times, however, he seems to doubt whether such
rational awareness alone is sufficient for motivation. On this point, see Schneewind 1997a, xvi.
Although Kant may waver on this point in Collins, his later discussions in Mrongovius II (1784–1785)
and Vigilantius (1793–1794) are decisive that virtue involves acting dutifully from duty.
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the sake of duty, is indoles erecta. That act alone is morally good, which is
done because it is a duty. (M II 29:624)
The fact that Kant treats virtue and duty as moral concepts that cannot be
prised apart underlies his claim that there is only one (purely) formal
principle of ethics or general principle of virtue (one obligation of virtue),
namely, the duty to do all of our duties from duty (V 27:541).
An important consequence of this account of motivation in the virtuous
person is that moral obligation involves the necessitation of the will by
practical reason. To act from duty is to act from a voluntary feeling of
respect for the moral law, where acting from such a rationally grounded
feeling necessarily involves self-constraint and moral compulsion, and sig-
nifies that we obey the law in the face of opposition from inclinations (M II
29:617; V 27:518–520). Kant reasons that, if morality ceased to involve the
necessitation of the will by practical reason, we would no longer experience
moral laws as imperatives, or have any need for virtue, as a steadfast
disposition to fulfill one’s duties strictly:
Where there is no necessitation, there also no moral imperative, no obliga-
tion, duty, virtue, ought or constraint is conceivable. Hence the moral laws
are called laws of duty, because they presuppose an agent subject to impulses
of nature. (V 27:489)
It is this key aspect of Kant’s account of virtue – that abiding by moral laws
from a purely moral disposition involves doing one’s duty from duty and a
feeling of necessitation by practical reason – that accounts for Kant’s
fundamental disagreement with Schiller. Readers familiar with Schiller’s
critique of Kant’s rationalist moral theory in “On Grace and Dignity” will
recall that Schiller claims to agree with the fundamental tenets of Kant’s
moral theory. His concern is primarily with the manner in which Kant
presents his doctrines. According to Schiller, the problem with Kant’s
presentation of his moral theory is that it that it leaves us with the harsh
impression that inclination is “a very suspicious companion, and pleasure a
dangerous auxiliary for moral determinations” (GD 169; 205).20 Schiller,
however, thinks that this rigid Kantian picture can be improved upon by
attempting to “ uphold, in the realm of appearance and in the actual practice
of moral duty, the claims of sensibility, which are completely repudiated in
the realm of pure reason and in moral legislation” (GD 169f; 205). In terms
20 “On Grace and Dignity” was first published in 1793 in the second edition ofNeue Thalia. References
to this essay (GD) are to Schiller 1966 and to the corresponding page in the anonymous English
translation of 1902.
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of Schiller’s governing metaphor, this emphasis on the aesthetic dimension
of morality will show how Kantian dignity (Wu¨rde) is complemented and
perfected by grace (Anmut).
For our purposes here, the crucial aspect of Schiller’s critique to keep in
mind is that he thinks virtue requires cultivating one’s sensible nature to
harmonize positively with reason so that the virtuous person is inclined to
act in accordance with the moral law and takes pleasure in moral action.21
Schiller conceives of the person who has unified her sensible and rational
natures as a “beautiful soul,” where a beautiful soul is considered a “child of
the house” of practical reason, as opposed to its “servant” (GD 172; 208). In
light of the fact that a child of the house has trained her inclinations to
accord with duty and to work toward bringing about morally good ends, she
is not required to consult reason for guidance before she acts and can even
“abandon herself with a certain security to instinct” (GD 173; 209). Schiller
argues, further, that this beautiful soul does not experience the moral law as
an obligation signifying compulsion and constraint (GD 172; 208). In short,
Schiller denies that moral laws necessarily take the form of categorical
imperatives for all finite rational beings on the grounds that the imperatival
form of the law would strike a child of the house as “a foreign and positive
law,” a law imposed by an external authority (GD 172; 208). He holds that
the person who displays grace is not the one who forces herself to act
dutifully, relying on the thought of duty as an incentive, but the one
whose inclinations have been so completely transformed as to elicit
the right conduct without being commanded, and without experiencing
the moral law as an imperative at all.
Kant’s published reply to Schiller appears in a famous footnote in
Religion (RGV 6:23f n.). Yet, while Kant’s reaction to Schiller in Religion
is ambiguous, an important discussion in the Vigilantius’ lecture notes
on ethics is especially instructive in explaining why Kant rejects Schiller’s
account of the beautiful soul as an exemplar of moral virtue.22
21 Schiller identifies virtue as “nothing other than an inclination for duty,” and he insists that, “unless
obedience to reason is a source of pleasure, it cannot become an object of inclination” (GD 170, 169;
206, 204).
22 In Religion, Kant states that he and Schiller agree on the most important principles (RGV 6:23n.).
Kant then explains that he explicitly distinguishes dignity from grace in an effort to emphasize the
purity of duty, which involves “unconditional necessitation, to which gracefulness stands in direct
contradiction” (RGV 6:23n.). Nevertheless, Kant says that Schiller’s graces are relevant when we turn
from an analysis of the nature and ground of moral obligation to consider the aesthetic character of
virtue, that is, the feelings associated with virtue as a character trait and the feelings that virtue elicits
in us as rational appraisers. In acknowledging that the graces accompany virtue, Kant thus emphasizes
the idea that the temperament of the virtuous person is joyous and that the virtuous person does her
duty with a cheerful heart. Yet, as commentators have noted, Kant overstates the matter when he
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In Vigilantius, Kant prefaces his discussion of Schiller by explaining that, for
a holy will, what is objectively necessary is also subjectively necessary, which
means that a holy will does what the moral law requires without having to
be commanded. By contrast, for a finite rational will, whatever action the
laws of reason command “does not always result from them, owing to its
subjective contingency, rooted in the impulses of human nature”
(V 27:489). As we have seen, virtue presupposes some element of struggle
and (inner) conflict because our very condition is one in which we must
overcome a deep-rooted tendency of will to act on sensible feelings, desires,
and interests that run contrary to the moral law. This means that we can
never get beyond the bare possibility of being tempted to act contrary to
duty and hence we require virtue, as an acquired moral strength of will to
constrain or compel ourselves (in accordance with duty) to do what we
would not do of our own accord (by our very nature). Whereas Schiller
thinks that the moral law takes the form of an imperative only insofar as an
agent actually has contrary inclinations that pose temptations, for Kant, the
imperatival form of the moral laws presupposes only the possibility for
transgressing the moral law, not actual temptation.
Furthermore, given that moral imperatives entail a notion of necessita-
tion of the finite will by practical reason, Kant remarks that it is “contrary to
the nature of duty to enjoy having duties incumbent upon one” (V 27:489).
On the contrary, we obey the law reluctantly, that is, in the face of
opposition from a formidable opponent, an opponent that virtue as
“a steadfast determination in obeying the moral laws” enables us to over-
come (V 27:490). As Kant thus makes clear in his discussion of Schiller, we
require a power of self-constraint and moral compulsion in our efforts to
abide by duty from duty, and this fact about our moral experience rules out
Schiller’s idea that the fulfillment of moral laws “also has a certain charm
(grace) about it” (V 27:490).
Yet, while Kant reminds us that the moral law issues its commands
without attracting us, he denies that law demands our “respect in the
manner of painful or despotic commands” (V 27:490). The feeling of
respect the moral law elicits in us is akin to a feeling of awe and sublimity
suggests that this puts him in full agreement with Schiller on matters of principle. Schiller’s
contention is not that grace accompanies virtue, but that grace is at least partially constitutive of virtue.
It is therefore not enough for Kant to agree that the virtuous person has a “heart joyous in the
compliance of duty,” because Schiller’s point is that pleasure engages moral action in the genuinely
virtuous person and that virtuous person is inclined to do her duty, which she does not experience as
an obligation (RGV 6:23n.). Thus, in spite of Kant’s conciliatory tone in his official reply to Schiller,
there are substantive points of disagreement between them, which Vigilantius helps clarify.
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in response to the unconditional dignity tied up with our own self-
legislating rational nature. For Kant, then, pleasure factors into our experi-
ence of virtue, but the uniquely moral pleasure associated with virtue is
always consequential upon doing one’s duty from duty (V 27:490).
In sum, Kant rejects Schiller’s conception of the beautiful soul as an
appropriate model of moral perfection for finite rational beings because
what defines our status as imperfect beings is that we have sensible needs
and inclinations that do not of themselves accord with the moral law. More
precisely, we have a tendency to grant priority to sensible needs and
inclinations that run contrary to duty because of our propensity for evil.23
As a result, the best that we can attain is virtue, a morally good disposition to
do one’s duty from duty and to compel oneself to act in accordance with the
moral law from respect, out of necessitation by practical reason.
Conclusion
As this analysis of Kant’s account of virtue in the Lectures on Ethics has
shown, Kant thinks of virtue as a form of moral self-mastery or self-
command that represents a model of self-governance he compares to an
autocracy. In light of the fact that the very concept of virtue presupposes
struggle and conflict, Kant insists that virtue is distinct from holiness and
that any ideal of moral perfection that overlooks the fact that morality is
always difficult for us fails to provide an appropriate model of human virtue.
Nomatter howmorally good we are or become, virtue remains a disposition
to do one’s duty from duty, out of necessitation by practical reason. Yet,
even though finite rational beings require a power of self-constraint in
accordance with the commands of duty to comply with the law (which
we obey reluctantly), the virtuous agent displays a unified soul that is at
peace. This picture of virtue uncovered from the Lectures on Ethics thus
reveals the way in which Kant’s conception of virtue accords with his
foundational commitments in his moral theory, while at the same time
representing a more complex theory of moral character and a life lived in
accordance with practical reason.
23 Schiller realizes that Kant’s view that we have “radical tendency” (radikalen Hang) to act in opposition
to the moral law supports the idea that moral laws always take the imperatival form for even the
person with full virtue, but Schiller rejects this doctrine of evil and is consequently not worried about
the risk involved in allowing moralized inclination to execute morally good conduct (GD 172; 208).
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